Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the possible computation runs of the system; and strategies define the behaviour of agents. Typically, strategies are modelled as functions from sequences of system states to player actions. Analysing a system in such a setting involves computing the set of (Nash) equilibria in the concurrent game. However, we show that, with respect to the above model of strategies (arguably, the "standard" model in the computer science literature), bisimilarity does not preserve the existence of Nash equilibria. Thus, two concurrent games which are behaviourally equivalent from a semantic perspective, and which from a logical perspective satisfy the same temporal logic formulae, may nevertheless have fundamentally different properties (solutions) from a game theoretic perspective. Our aim in this paper is to explore the issues raised by this discovery. After illustrating the issue by way of a motivating example, we present three models of strategies with respect to which the existence of Nash equilibria is preserved under bisimilarity. We use some of these models of strategies to provide new semantic foundations for logics for strategic reasoning, and investigate restricted scenarios where bisimilarity can be shown to preserve the existence of Nash equilibria with respect to the conventional model of strategies in the computer science literature.
Introduction
The concept of bisimilarity plays a central role in both the theory of concurrency [34, 28] and logic [44, 28] . In the context of concurrency, bisimilar systems are regarded as behaviourally equivalent-appearing to have the same behaviour when interacting with an arbitrary environment. From a logical/verification perspective, bisimilar systems are known to satisfy the same temporal logic properties with respect to languages such as LTL, CTL, or logic property, say ϕ, is satisfied by these system components whenever they choose to use strategies that form an equilibrium, that is, we want to know whether for some/every computation run ρ ∈ NE (P 1 , . . . , P n ) we have ρ |= ϕ, where NE (P 1 , . . . , P n ) denotes the set of all computation runs that may be generated as a result of P 1 , . . . , P n selecting strategies that form a Nash equilibrium. Because we are interested in concurrent systems, and bisimilarity is one of the most important behavioural equivalences in concurrency [33, 28, 17, 47] , it is highly desirable that properties which hold in equilibrium are sustained across all systems that are bisimilar to P 1 , . . . , P n , meaning that for every (temporal logic) property ϕ and every process P ′ i , if P ′ i is bisimilar to P i ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P n }, then ϕ is satisfied in equilibrium by P 1 , . . . P i . . . P n if and only if is also satisfied in equilibrium by P 1 , . . . P ′ i . . . , P n , the system in which P i is replaced by P ′ i , that is, across all bisimilar systems to P 1 , . . . , P n . This property, called invariance under bisimilarity, has been widely used for decades for the semantic analysis (e.g., for modular and compositional reasoning) and formal verification (e.g., for temporal logic model checking) of concurrent systems. Unfortunately, as shown here, and already discussed in [22] , the satisfaction of temporal logic properties in equilibrium is not invariant under bisimilarity, thus posing a verification challenge for the modular and compositional reasoning of concurrent systems, since individual system components in a concurrent system cannot be replaced by (behaviourally equivalent) bisimilar ones, while preserving the temporal logic properties that the overall system satisfies in equilibrium. This is also a problem from a synthesis point of view. Indeed, a strategy for a system component P i may not be a valid strategy for a bisimilar system component P ′ i . As a consequence, the problem of building strategies for individual processes in the concurrent system P 1 , . . . P i . . . P n may not, in general, be the same as building strategies for a bisimilar system P 1 , . . . P ′ i . . . P n , again, dashing any hope of modular reasoning on concurrent systems.
Motivated by these observations-which bring together in a striking way a fundamental concept in game theory and a fundamental concept in logic/concurrency-the purpose of the present paper is to investigate these issues in detail. We first present a motivating example, to illustrate the basic point that using the conventional model of strategies, bisimulation need not preserve Nash equilibria. We then present three alternative models of strategies in which Nash equilibria and their existence are preserved under bisimilarity. We also study the above question for different classes of systems, for instance deterministic and nondeterministic ones, and explore applications to logic. Specifically, we investigate the implications of replacing the conventional model of strategies with some of the models we propose in this paper in logics for strategic reasoning [35, 12] , in particular, the semantic implications with respect to Strategy Logic (SL [35] ) . We also show that, within the conventional model of strategies, Nash equilibrium is preserved by bisimilarity in certain two-player games as well as in the class of concurrent game structures that are induced by iterated Boolean games [23] , a framework that can be used to reason about the strategic behaviour of AI, autonomous, and multi-agent systems [48] . Our main invariance results are summarised in Table 1. 1. 1 . A Motivating Example. So far we have mentioned some cases where one needs or desires a property to be invariant under bisimilarity. However, one may still wonder why it is so important that the particular property of having a Nash equilibrium is preserved under bisimilarity. One reason has its roots in automated formal verification. To illustrate this, imagine that the system of Figure 1 is given as input to a verification tool. It is likely that such a tool will try to perform as many optimisations as possible to the system before any analysis is performed. Perhaps the simplest of such optimisations-as is being done by virtually every model checking tool-is to reduce the input system by merging isomorphic subtrees. This is done, e.g., when generating the ROBDD representation of a system. If such an optimisation is made, the tool will construct the (bisimilar) system in Figure 2 .
(Observe that the subgraphs rooted at s 1 and s ′ 1 are isomorphic.) However, with respect to the existence of Nash equilibria, such a transformation is unsound in the general case. For instance, suppose that the system in Figure 1 represents a 3-player game, where each transition is labelled by the choices x, y, z made by player 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and asterisk * being a wildcard for any action for the player in the respective position. Thus, whereas players 1 and 2 can choose to play either a or b at each state, player 3 can choose between a, b, a ′ , or b ′ . The states are labelled by valuations xy over {p, q}, wherex indicates that x is set to false. Assume that player 1 would like p to be true sometime, that player 2 would like q to be true sometime, and that player 3 desires to prevent both player 1 and player 2 from achieving their goals. Accordingly, their preferences/goals can, respectively, be formally represented by the LTL formulae
where, informally, Fϕ means "eventually ϕ holds" and Gϕ means "always ϕ holds". Moreover, given these players' goals and the conventional model of strategies, we will see later in Section 4 that the system in Figure 1 has a Nash equilibrium, whereas no Nash equilibria exists in the (bisimilar) concurrent system presented in Figure 2 . This example illustrates a major issue when analysing (the existence of) Nash equilibria in the most widely used models of strategies and multi-player games in the computer science literature, namely, that even the simplest and most innocuous optimisations commonly used in automated verification are not necessarily sound with respect to game-theoretic analyses. make between computations, runs, and traces may appear to be insignificant, but are in fact central in our analysis of bisimilarity and Nash equilibrium.
A state s ′ is accessible from another state s whenever there is some d = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) such that d is legal at s and δ(s, a 1 , . . . , a n ) = s ′ . For easy readability we then also write s d −→ s ′ . An (infinite) computation is then an infinite sequence of directions κ = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . such that there are states s 0 , s 1 , . . . with s 0 = s 0 M and s 0
Observe that, having assumed the transition function δ to be complete and deterministic, in every concurrent game model the states s 0 , s 1 , . . . in the above definition always exist and are unique. A finite computation is any finite prefix of a computation κ. We also allow a finite computation to be the empty sequence ǫ of directions. The sets of infinite and finite computations are denoted by comps ω M and comps M , respectively. We also use δ * (s, d 0 , d 1 , . . . d k ) to denote the unique state that is reached from the state s after applying the computation d 0 , d 1 , . . . d k .
An (infinite) run is an infinite sequence ρ = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 . . . of states of sequentially accessible states, with s 0 = s 0 M . We say that run s 0 , . . . , s k is induced by computation d 0 , . . .
−→ · · · and s 0 = s 0 M . Thus, every computation induces a unique run and every run is induced by at least one computation. By a finite run or (finite) history we mean a finite prefix of a run. The sets of infinite and finite runs are denoted by runs ω M and runs M , respectively.
An (infinite) trace is a sequence τ = v 0 , v 1 , v 2 , . . . of valuations such that there is a run ρ = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . in runs ω M such that v k = λ(s k ) for every k ≥ 0, that is, τ = λ(s 0 ), λ(s 1 ), λ(s 2 ), . . . . In that case we say that trace τ is induced by run ρ, and if ρ is induced by computation κ, also that τ is induced by κ. By a finite trace we mean a finite prefix of a trace. We denote the sets of finite and infinite traces of a concurrent game structure M by traces M and traces ω M , respectively. We use ρ M (κ) to denote the run induced by a computation κ in CGS M , and write π M (κ) if κ is finite on the understanding that π M (ǫ) = s 0 M . Also, if ρ = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . is a run, by τ M (ρ) we denote the trace λ(s 0 ), λ(s 1 ), λ(s 2 ), . . . , and similarly for finite runs π ∈ runs M . Finally, τ M (ρ M (κ)) is abbreviated as τ M (κ). When no confusion is likely, we omit the subscript M and the qualification 'finite'. Bisimilarity. One of the most important behavioural/observational equivalences in concurrency is bisimilarity, which is usually defined over Kripke structures or labelled transition systems (see, e.g., [34, 28] ). However, the equivalence can be uniformly defined for general concurrent game structures, where decisions/directions play the role of, for instance, actions in transition systems. Formally, let M = (AP, Ag, Ac, St, s 0 M , λ, δ) and M ′ = (AP, Ag, Ac, St ′ , s 0 M ′ , λ ′ , δ ′ ) be two concurrent game structures. A bisimulation, denoted by ∼, between states s * ∈ St and t * ∈ St ′ is a non-empty binary relation R ⊆ St × St ′ , such that s * R t * and for all s, s ′ ∈ St, t, t ′ ∈ St ′ , and d ∈ Dir:
Then, if there is a bisimulation between two states s * and t * , we say that they are bisimilar and write s * ∼ t * in such a case. We also say that concurrent game structures M and
Since the transition functions of concurrent game structures, as defined, are deterministic, we have the following simple but useful facts. We say that runs ρ = s 0 , s 1 , . . . and ρ ′ = s ′ 0 , s ′ 1 , . . . are statewise bisimilar (in symbols ρ∼ ρ ′ ) if s k ∼ s ′ k for every k ≥ 0. Both bisimilarity and statewise bisimilarity are equivalence relations, which is a standard result in the literature (see, for instance, [18, 5, 34] ).
We find, moreover, that the sets of (finite) computations as well as the sets of (finite) traces of two bisimilar concurrent game structures are identical. In order to see this, the following simple auxiliary result is useful.
Then, s ∼ t, s such that f trace i (τ ) ∈ Ac i (s k ) for every trace τ ∈ traces M and every run π = s 0 , . . . , s k such that τ = λ(s 0 ), . . . , λ(s k ).
A computation-based strategy profile is then a tuple f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) that associates with each player i a computation-based strategy f i . Run-based and trace-based strategy profiles are defined analogously.
Every computation-based strategy profile f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) induces a unique computation . . in M that is defined inductively as follows: . . in a similar manner:
Finally, the computation κ M (f ) defined by a trace-based strategy profile f is given by
If M is clear from the context, we usually omit the subscript in κ M (f ). For f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) a profile of computation-based, run-based, or trace-based strategies, we write with a slight abuse of notation ρ(f 1 , . . . , f n ) for ρ(κ(f 1 , . . . , f n )) and τ (f 1 , . . . , f n ) for τ (ρ(f 1 , . . . , f n )).
As the computations and traces of bisimilar concurrent games structures coincide (Lemma 2.2), we can now establish that a player's computation-based and trace-based strategies coincide in bisimilar concurrent game structures. Moreover, the computations induced by them will be identical. Lemma 3. 1 . Let M and M ′ be bisimilar concurrent game structures and i a player. Then, every computation-based strategy for i in M is also a computation-based strategy for i in M ′ , and every trace-based strategy for i in M is also a trace-based strategy for i in M ′ . Moreover, for every computation-based profile f for M we have that κ M (f ) = κ M ′ (f ), and for every trace-based profile g that κ M (g) = κ M ′ (g).
Proof.
First, let f i be a computation-based strategy for i in M . We show that f i is also a computation-based strategy for i in M ′ . To this end, consider an arbitrary κ ∈ comps M ′ . Let π M ′ (κ) = t 0 , . . . , t k . It suffices to prove that f i (κ) ∈ Ac i (t k ). To see this, first observe that by Lemma 2.2 also κ ∈ comps M and let π M (κ) = s 0 , . . . , s k . In virtue of Lemma 2.2, then s k ∼ t k . Moreover, because f i is a computation-based strategy for i in M , we have f i (κ) ∈ Ac i (s k ). Now consider any legal direction d k = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) at s k with a i = f i (κ).
Then, there is some state
The case if g i is a trace-based strategy for i in M is similar. We then have to prove that g i is also a trace-based strategy for i in M ′ as well. To this end, consider an arbitrary finite trace τ ∈ traces M ′ and run π = t 0 , . . . , t k such that τ = λ M ′ (t 0 ), . . . , λ M ′ (t k ). It then suffices to prove that g i (τ ) ∈ Ac i (t k ). We may assume that π is induced by a computation κ ∈ comps M ′ , that is, π = π M ′ (κ). By Lemma 2.2 we have κ ∈ comps M and by Lemma 2
As g i is a run-based strategy for i in M we have g i (τ ) ∈ Ac i (s k ). Let, furthermore, d = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) be a legal direction at s k with a i = g i (τ ). Then, there is some state
For the second part of the lemma, let f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) be a computation-based strategy profile in M . Then, f is a computation-based strategy profile in M ′ as well.
For the induction step we may assume that d 0 , . . . , d . . and show by induction on k that for every k ≥ 0 we have that
. For the induction step, we may assume that d 0 , . . . , d 
. Now the following equations hold:
, which concludes the proof.
With the states of bisimilar structures possibly being distinct, however, a statement analogous to Lemma 3.1 cannot be shown to hold for run-based strategies.
Preferences and Goals. We assume the agents of a concurrent game structure to have preferences on basis of which they choose their strategies. Formally, we specify the preferences of a player i of a CGS M as a subset Γ i of computations, that is, Γ i ⊆ comps ω M and refer to Γ i as i's goal set. Player i is then understood to (strictly) prefer computations in Γ i to those not in Γ i and to be indifferent otherwise. Accordingly, each player's preferences are dichotomous, only distinguishing between the preferred computations in Γ i and the not preferred ones not in Γ i . Formally, player i is said to weakly prefer computation κ to computation κ ′ if κ ∈ Γ i whenever κ ′ ∈ Γ i , and to strictly prefer κ to κ ′ if i weakly prefers κ to κ ′ but not the other way round. If i both weakly prefers κ to κ ′ and weakly prefers κ ′ to κ, player i is said to be indifferent between κ and κ ′ .
Our choice to assume the players' preferences to be computation-based preferencesthat is, to model their goals as sets of computations rather than, say, sets of runs or sets of traces-is for technical convenience and flexibility. Recall that every set of runs induces a set of computations, namely the set of computations that give rise to the same runs, and similarly for every set of traces. Thus, we say that a goal set Γ i ⊆ comps ω M is run-based if for any two computations κ and κ ′ with ρ(κ) = ρ(κ ′ ) we have that κ ∈ Γ i if and only if κ ′ ∈ Γ.
Similarly, Γ i is said to be trace-based whenever τ (κ) = τ (κ ′ ) implies κ ∈ Γ i if and only if κ ′ ∈ Γ i . In other words, in our setting, formally, run-based goals are computation-based goals closed under induced runs, and trace-based goals are computation-based goals closed under induced traces.
Sometimes-as we did in the example in the introduction-players' goals are specified by temporal logic formulae [18] . As the satisfaction of goals only depends on traces, they will directly correspond to trace-based goals, given our formalisation of goals and preferences.
Games and Nash Equilibrium. With the above definitions in place, we are now in a position to define a game on a concurrent game structure M (also called a CGS-game) with Ag = {1, . . . , n} as a tuple G = (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ), where, for each player i in M , the set Γ i ⊆ comps ω M is a goal set specifying i's dichotomous preferences over the computations in M .
In a CGS-game the players can all play either computation-based strategies, run-based strategies, or trace-based strategies. For each such choice of type of strategies, with the set of players and their preferences specified, every CGS-game defines a strategic game in the standard game-theoretic sense. Observe that the set of strategies is infinite in general. Thus the game-theoretic solution concept of Nash equilibrium becomes available for the analysis of games on concurrent game structures. If f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is a strategy profile and g i a strategy for player i, we write (f −i , g i ) for the strategy profile (f
. . , f n ), which is identical to f except that i's strategy is replaced by g i . Formally, given a CGS-game, we say that a profile f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) of computation-based strategies is a Nash equilibrium in computation-based strategies (or computation-based equilibrium) if, for every player i and every computation-based strategy g i available to i,
The concepts of Nash equilibrium in run-based strategies and Nash equilibrium in tracebased strategies are defined analogously, where, importantly, the strategies in f −i and g i are required to be of the same type, that is, either they are all run-based or they are all trace-based. If κ(f ) / ∈ Γ i whereas κ(f −i , g i ) ∈ Γ i , we also say that player i would like to deviate from f (and play g i instead). Thus, a run-based profile f is a run-based equilibrium whenever no player would like to deviate from it and play some run-based strategy different from f i . Similarly, a trace-based profile f is a trace-based equilibrium if no player likes to deviate and play another trace-based strategy.
We say that a computation κ, run ρ, or a trace τ is sustained by a Nash equilibrium f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) (of any type) whenever κ = κ(f ), ρ = ρ(f ), and τ = τ (f ), respectively. We also refer to a computation, run, or trace that is sustained by a Nash equilibrium as an equilibrium computation, equilibrium run, and equilibrium trace, respectively.
Computation-based equilibrium is a weaker notion than run-based equilibrium, in the sense that if f is a run-based equilibrium there is also a corresponding computation-based equilibrium, but not necessarily the other way round. Run-based equilibrium, in turn, is in a similar way a weaker concept than trace-based equilibrium. As computation-based, runbased, and trace-based strategies are set-theoretically of different types, a comparison cannot be made directly. To make the comparison precise, we therefore identify two subclasses of computation-based strategies, run-invariant strategies and trace-invariant strategies, that characterise the behaviour of, respectively, run-based and trace-based strategies.
We say that a computation-based strategy f i :
Observe that thus a strategy f i being trace-invariant implies f i being run-invariant, but not necessarily the other way around.
We observe that there are one-one correspondences between run-based strategies on the one hand and run-invariant computation-based strategies on the other, and similarly between trace-based strategies and trace-invariant computation-based strategies. Let f i : runs M → Ac be a run-based strategy. Then definef i : comps M → Ac as the computation-based strategy such that for every finite computation κ ∈ comps M we havef i (κ) = f i (π M (κ)). Similarly, if g i : traces M → Ac is a trace-based strategy. Then, defineǧ i : comps → Ac i as the computation-based strategy such that for every finite computation κ ∈ comps M we haveǧ i (κ) = g i (τ M (κ)).
Lemma 3.2.
For run-based strategies f i and trace-based strategies g i , the mappings f i →f i and g i →ǧ i are one-to-one.
Proof. Let f i a run-based strategy. We first show thatf i is run-invariant. To this end, let κ, κ ′ ∈ comps M be computations such that π M (κ) = π M (κ ′ ). Then,
To show that the mapping is onto, let g i be an arbitrary run-invariant strategy. Now define run-based strategyĝ i such that, for every run π ∈ runs M and κ ∈ comps M with π = π M (κ) we haveĝ i (π) = g i (κ). Observe thatĝ i is well-defined since, , by run-invariance of g i , for all κ, κ ′ ∈ comps M with π M (κ) = π M (κ ′ ) = π we have that g i (κ) = g i (κ ′ ).
Finally, to see that the mapping is injective, let f i and f ′ i be two distinct run-based strategies. Then, there is a run π ∈ runs M such that f i (π) = f ′ i (π). We may assume the existence of a computation κ ∈ comps M such that π M (κ) = π. Then,
, as desired. This concludes the proof.
Furthermore, each profile of run-invariant strategies induces the same computation in a concurrent game structure as its run-based counterpart. A similar remark applies to trace-invariant and trace-based profiles. 
, f n ) be a run-based profile and g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) a trace-based profile. Then,
and
For the induction step, we may assume that d 0 , . . . , d k = d ′ 0 , . . . , d ′ k . Now the following equalities hold. 
The argument for trace-based and traceinvariant strategies runs along analogous lines, mutatis mutandis.
We say that a computation-based profile f = (f 
, f n ) and g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) be a run-based profile, respectively, a trace-based profile in a CGS-game G = (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) based on M . Then, (1) f is a run-based equilibrium if and only iff is a run-invariant equilibrium , (2) g is a trace-based equilibrium if and only ifǧ is a trace-invariant equilibrium.
Proof. For the run-based case, the following equivalences hold by virtue of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3:
The proof of the second part is by an analogous argument, mutatis mutandis.
Computation-based strategies grant a player more strategic flexibility than do runinvariant strategies. A similar remark applies to run-invariant strategies and trace-invariant strategies. Still, we find that, if a player i wishes to deviate from a computation-based profile f and play another computation-based strategy, i would also like to deviate by playing a run-invariant or even a trace-invariant strategy. This insight underlies the following result. 1 Proof. For part 1, first assume that f is a run-invariant equilibrium in G. For a contradiction assume moreover that f is not a computation-based equilibrium. Then, there is a player i and a computation-based strategy
Observe that f ′ i need not be run-invariant. We therefore define strategy f ′′ i for player i such that f ′′ i (ǫ) = f ′ i (ǫ) and, for all finite computations d 0 , . . . , d k ,
If k = 0, we immediately obtain that
For the induction step, we may assume that d ′ 0 , . . . , d ′ k = d ′′ 0 , . . . , d ′′ k . and the following equalities hold:
For the opposite direction, assume for contraposition that f is not a run-invariant equilibrium. Then, there is some player i who would like to deviate from f and play some run-invariant strategy f ′ i . As run-invariant strategies are strategy-based by definition, it follows that f is not a computation-based equilibrium either.
Part 2 follows by an analogous argument, mutatis mutandis.
Theorem 3.5 does not preclude the existence of computation-based equilibria that fail to be run-invariant or trace-invariant, that is, the three equilibrium concepts-computationbased, run-invariant, and trace-invariant equilibrium-are not equivalent. However, they can be ordered with respect to how restrictive they are, that is, with respect to the sets of profiles they exclude as solutions.
Proof. Merely observe that if f is a run-invariant equilibrium, it is also a run-invariant profile. If f is moreover trace-invariant it is also run-invariant. The result then immediately follows from Theorem 3.5.
On basis of the findings in this section, we may with justification claim that every trace-based equilibrium corresponds to a run-based equilibrium, and that every run-based equilibrium corresponds with some computation-based equilibrium, even if the converses of these statements do not generally hold. that run-based preferences may not be preserved across bisimilar systems.
Invariance of Nash Equilibria under Bisimilarity
From a computational point of view, one may expect games based on bisimilar concurrent game structures and with identical players' preferences to exhibit similar properties, in particular with respect to their Nash equilibria. We find that, while this is indeed the case for games with computation-based strategies as well as for games with trace-based strategies, for games with run-based strategies the situation is considerably more complicated. A key observation is that, by contrast to computation-based and trace-based strategies, there need not be a natural one-to-one mapping between the sets of run-based strategies in bisimilar concurrent game models. By restricting attention to so-called bisimulation-invariant runbased strategies, however, we find that order can be restored.
Invariance under Bisimilarity and Preference Types. We are primarily interested in the Nash equilibria of games that are the same up to bisimilarity of the underlying concurrent game structures. The Nash equilibria of a game, however, essentially depend on the players' preferences. Accordingly, the Nash equilibria of two bisimilar CGS-games can only be meaningfully compared if we also we assume that the players' preferences in these two games are identical. We formalised players' preferences as sets of computations, and, due to Lemma 2.2, this enables a straightforward comparison of players' goal sets across bisimilar concurrent game structures.
In Section 3, we also distinguished run-based and trace-based preferences, that is, goal sets closed under computations that induce the same runs and traces, respectively. We are also interested in the invariance of the existence of Nash equilibria in games on bisimilar concurrent game structures where the players' preferences games are what we will call congruent, that is, both the same and of the same type in both games.
For computation-based and trace-based preferences the issue of congruence is moot. Observe that for bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M ′ , if a goal set Γ i is computationbased in M , then it is also computation-based in M ′ . Due to Lemma 2.3, the same holds for trace-based preferences.
This preservation of preference type under bisimilarity, however, does not extend to run-based preferences. To see this, consider Figure 3 and let the goal set Γ i of some player i be given by all computations κ = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . with d 0 = (a, a). Then, obviously, Γ i is run-based in the game G 2 based on M 2 on the left, but not in the game G 3 based on M 3 to the right. To see the latter, consider any computation
. By contrast, the goal set given by all computations
Computation-based Strategies. If strategies are computation-based, players can have their actions depend on virtually all information that is available in the system. In an important sense full transparency prevails and different actions can be chosen on bisimilar states provided that the computations that led to them are different. Moreover, the strategies available to players in bisimilar concurrent game structures are identical. Thus we obtain our first main result. . . , Γ n ) be games on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M ′ , respectively, and let f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) be a computation-based profile. Then, f is a Nash equilibrium in computation-based strategies in G if and only if f is a Nash equilibrium in computation-based strategies in G ′ .
Proof.
First assume for contraposition that f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is not a Nash equilibrium in computation-based strategies in M ′ . Then, there is a player i and a strategy g
Observe that, as the computation-based strategies of players in bisimilar structures coincide (cf., Lemma 3.1), f is also a strategy profile in M and g i a strategy for i in M . Moreover, recall that the computations induced by the same strategy profile in different but bisimilar structures are identical (cf., second part of Lemma 3.1). This yields
We may conclude that f is not a computation-based equilibrium in M either. The opposite direction follows by an analogous argument. Theorem 4.1 holds for computation-based preferences. As run-based preferences and trace-based preferences are computation-based preferences of a special kind, the result immediately extends to games in which the players' preferences are run-based in both games or trace-based preferences in both games. As a consequence of Theorem 4.1, moreover, we find that sustenance of runs and traces by computation-based equilibrium is also preserved under bisimilarity. The argument for part 2 runs along analogous lines. First assume that τ is sustained by computation-based equilibrium f , that is, τ = τ M (f ). By Theorem 4.1, we have that f is a computation-based equilibrium in G ′ as well. Now consider κ M (f ). By Lemma 3.1
. It thus follows that τ is sustained by f , a computation based Nash equilibrium, in G ′ . The argument in the opposite direction is analogous, giving the result.
Trace-based Strategies. As we saw in Lemma 2.2, the sets of (finite) traces of two bisimilar concurrent game structures coincide. Lemma 3.1 shows that the same holds for the trace-based strategies that are available to the players. As a consequence, we can directly compare their trace-based Nash-equilibria. We find that, like computation-based equilibria, trace-based Nash equilibria are preserved in CGS-games based on bisimilar concurrent game structures. . . , Γ n ) be games on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M ′ , respectively, and f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) be a trace-based strategy profile. Then, f is a Nash equilibrium in trace-based strategies in G if and only if f is a Nash equilibrium in trace-based strategies in G ′ .
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one for Theorem 4.1 for the computation-based case. First assume for contraposition that f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is not a Nash equilibrium in tracebased strategies in M ′ . Then, there is a player i and a trace-based strategy
Observe that, as the trace-based strategies of players in bisimilar structures coincide (cf., Lemma 3.1), we have that f is also a tracebased strategy profile in M and g i a trace-based strategy for i in M . By the second part of Lemma 3.1, moreover,
We may conclude that f is not a trace-based equilibrium in M either. The opposite direction follows by an analogous argument.
Like Theorem 4.1, this result is for computation-based preferences in general, and as such immediately extends to the case in which the players' preferences are stipulated to be run-based in both games or trace-based in both games. Theorem 4.3 has further the following result as an immediate consequence, which is analogous to Corollary 4.2. Run-based Strategies. The positive results obtained using computation-based and tracebased strategies are now followed by a negative result, already mentioned in the introduction of the paper, which establishes that Nash equilibria in run-based strategies-the most widely-used strategy model in logic, computer science, and AI-are not preserved by bisimilarity. Previously we observed that the players' run-based strategies cannot straightforwardly be identified across two different concurrent game structures, even if they are bisimilar. We would therefore have to establish a correspondence between the run-based strategies in the one game and the run-based strategies in the other in an arguably ad hoc way. To cut this Gordian knot, we therefore show in this section the stronger result that the very existence of run-based equilibria is not preserved under bisimilarity. That is, we can have two bisimilar concurrent game structures, say M and M ′ , on which we base two games G and G ′ with congruent preferences, such that G has a Nash equilibrium and G ′ does not.
Theorem 4. 5 . The existence of run-based Nash equilibria is not preserved under bisimilarity. That is, there are games (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) and (M ′ , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M ′ such that a Nash equilibrium in run-based strategies exists in G but not in G ′ .
To see that the above statement holds, consider again the three-player game G 0 on the concurrent game structure M 0 in Figure 1 . Assume, as before, that player 1's goal set Γ 1 is given by those computations κ such that
Recall that, consequently, the preferences of players 1, 2, and 3 are tracebased and can be represented by the LTL formulas γ 1 = Fp, γ 2 = Fq, and γ 3 = G¬(p ∨ q), respectively.
Let f * 1 and f * 2 be any run-based strategies for players 1 and 2 such that f *
and observe that ρ M 0 (f * ) = s 0 , s 4 , s 4 , s 4 , . . . . Accordingly, player 3 has her goal achieved and does not want to deviate from f * . Players 1 and 2 do not have their goals achieved, but do not want to deviate from f * either. To see this, let g 1 be any run-based strategy for 1 such that g 1 (s 0 ) = b; observe that this is required for any meaningful deviation from f * by 1. Then . . , depending on whether f * 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b or f * 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a, respectively. In either case, player 1 does not get his goal achieved and it follows that he does not want to deviate from f * . An analogous argument-notice that the roles of player 1 and 2 are symmetric-shows that player 2 does not want to deviate from f * either. We may thus conclude that f * is a run-based equilibrium in G 0 . Now, consider the game G 1 on concurrent game structure M 1 in Figure 2 with the players' preferences as in M 0 . It is easy to check that M 0 and M 1 are bisimilar. Still, there is no run-based equilibrium in G 1 . To see this, consider an arbitrary run-based strategy
. Then, player 1 gets his goal achieved and players 2 and 3 do not. If f 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a then f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b and player 3 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 3 with g 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a. On the other hand, if f 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b, player 3 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 3 with g 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b. Player 3 would similarly like to deviate from f if we assume that
. , in whose case it is player 2 who gets his goal achieved. Now, assume that ρ M 1 (f ) = s 0 , s 1 , s 4 , s 4 , s 4 . . . . In this case player 3 does get her goal achieved, but players 1 and 2 do not. However, player 1 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 1 with g 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b or g 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a, depending on whether f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a or f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b; in a similar fashion, player 2 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 2 with g 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b if f 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a ′ , and to one with g 2 (s 0 , 
If the former, player 1 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 1 with g 1 (s 0 ) = f 1 (s 0 ) and g 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = f 3 (s 0 , s 1 ). If the latter, player 2 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 2 with g 2 (s 0 ) = f 2 (s 0 ) and either g 2 (s 0 ,
We can then conclude that the CGSgame G 1 does not have any run-based Nash equilibria.
The main idea behind this counter-example is that in G 0 player 3 could distinguish which player deviates from f * if the state reached after the first round is not s 4 : if that state is s 1 , it was player 1 who deviated, otherwise player 2. By choosing either a ′ or b ′ at s 1 , and either a or b at s ′ 1 , player 3 can guarantee that neither player 1 nor player 2 gets his goal achieved ("punish" them) and thus deter them from deviating from f * . This possibility to punish deviations from f * by players 1 and 2 in a single strategy is not available in the game on M 1 : choosing from a and b will induce a deviation by player 1, choosing from a ′ and b ′ one by player 2.
Observe that the games G 0 and G 1 do not constitute a counter-example against either the preservation under bisimilarity of computation-based equilibria or the preservation of trace-based equilibria. The reasons why such games fail to do so, however, are different. For the setting of computation-based strategies, player 3 can still distinguish and "punish" the deviating player in G 1 as (a, b, a) and (b, a, a) are different directions and player 3 can still have his action at s 1 depend on which of these is played at s 0 . By contrast, if we assume trace-based strategies, player 3 has to choose the same action at both s 1 and s ′ 1 in G 0 . As a consequence, and contrarily to computation-based equilibria, trace-based equilibria exist in neither G 0 nor G 1 . Also note that the goal sets Γ 1 , Γ 2 , and Γ 3 are run-based as well as computation-based both in G 1 and G 2 . Accordingly, the counter-example also applies to settings wherein the players' preferences are assumed to be finer-grained in these two ways.
Observe at this point that s 1 and s ′ 1 are bisimilar states. Yet, players are allowed to have run-based strategies (which depend on state histories only) that choose different actions at bisimilar states. The above counter-example shows how this relative richness of strategies makes a crucial difference. This raises the question as to whether we actually want players to adopt run-based strategies in which they choose different actions at bisimilar states. This observation leads us to the next section.
Bisimulation-invariant Run-based Strategies. Bisimilarity formally captures an informal concept of observational indistinguishability on the part of an external observer of the system. Now, the players in a concurrent game structure are in essentially the same situation as an external observer if they are assumed to be only able to observe the behaviour of the other players, without knowing their internal structure or their interaction.
Drawing on this idea of indistinguishability, it is natural that players cannot distinguish statewise bisimilar runs and, as a consequence, can only adopt strategies that choose the same action at runs that are statewise bisimilar. The situation is comparable to the one in extensive games of imperfect information, in which players are required to choose the same action in histories that are in the same information set, that is, histories that cannot be distinguished (cf., e.g., [37, 32] ).
To make this idea formally precise, we say that a run-based strategy f i is bisimulationinvariant if f i (π) = f i (π ′ ) for all histories π and π ′ that are statewise bisimilar. The concept of Nash equilibrium is then similarly restricted to bisimulation-invariant strategies. A profile f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) of bisimulation-invariant strategies is a Nash equilibrium in bisimulationinvariant strategies (or a bisimulation-invariant equilibrium) in a game (M, Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) if for all players i and every bisimulation-invariant strategy g i for i,
That is, f is a bisimulation-invariant equilibrium if no player wishes to deviate from f by playing a different bisimulation-invariant strategy. In contrast to the situation for general run-based strategies, we find that computations and traces that are sustained by a bisimulation-invariant Nash equilibrium are preserved by bisimulation. We show this by establishing a one-one correspondence between the bisimulation-invariant strategies available to the players in two bisimilar structures.
Based on the concept of state-wise bisimilarity, we associate with every bisimulationinvariant strategy f i for player i in concurrent game structure M , another bisimulationinvariant strategyf i for player i in any bisimilar concurrent game structure M ′ such that for all π ∈ runs M ′ and a ∈ Ac,
Transitivity of∼ guarantees thatf i is well defined. To see this, observe that for all π ′ , π ′′ ∈ runs M with π ′∼ π and π ′′∼ π, we have π ′∼ π ′′ . Having assumed that f i is bisimulationinvariant, then f i (π ′ ) = f i (π ′′ ). By very much the same argument,f i is bisimulationinvariant, if f i is. Proof. Consider two statewise bisimilar runs π, π ′ ∈ runs M ′ , that is, π∼ π ′ . Then, there are computations κ, κ ′ ∈ comps M ′ such that π M ′ (κ) = π and π M ′ (κ ′ ) = π ′ . By Lemma 2.3, we have π M (κ)∼ π M ′ (κ) and π M (κ ′ )∼ π M ′ (κ ′ ). Now, transitivity of∼ yields π M (κ)∼ π M (κ ′ ).
Having assumed that f i is bisimulation-invariant, we obtain that f i (π M (κ)) = f i (π M (κ ′ )). Finally, we may conclude thatf i (π) =f i (π ′ ), as desired.
Moreover, the mapping f i →f i is one-to-one. We will find that this is an essential property for bisimulation-invariant equilibria to be preserved under bisimilarity.
Lemma 4. 7 . Let M and M ′ be bisimilar concurrent game structures and i a player. Then, (1) for all bisimulation-invariant strategies f i and g i for i in M , if f i = g i then alsof i =g i , (2) for every bisimulation-invariant strategy g i for i in M ′ , there is a bisimulation-invariant strategy f i for i in M such that g i =f i .
Proof. For part 1, consider arbitrary bisimulation-invariant strategies f i and g i for i in M and assume that f i = g i . Then, there is a run π ∈ runs M such that f i (π) = g i (π). Observe that there is a computation κ ∈ comps ω M such that π M (κ) = π. Moreover, by Lemma 2.3, we obtain that π M (κ)∼ π M ′ (κ). By Lemma 4.6 we have thatf i andg i are both bisimulationinvariant as well. It follows thatf i (π M ′ (κ)) = g i (π M ′ (κ)) and hencef i =g i .
For part 2, consider an arbitrary bisimulation-invariant strategy g i for i in M ′ . Letg i be the corresponding bisimulation-invariant strategy for i in M and set f i =g i . We prove thatf i = g i . To this end, consider an arbitrary run π ∈ runs M ′ . Then there is also a computation κ ∈ comps M ′ with π = π M ′ (κ). By Lemma 2.3, then π M ′ (κ)∼ π M (κ) and, hence, g i (π M ′ (κ)) =g i (π M (κ)) = f i (π M (κ)) =f i (π M ′ (κ)). We may conclude that g i (π) =f i (π), as desired.
For a profile of bisimulation-invariant strategies f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) in M we denotef = (f 1 , . . . ,f n ). We then find that profiles f andf of bisimulation-invariant strategies induce identical computations. 
For the induction step, we may assume that d 0 , . . 
This concludes the proof.
We are now in a position to state an equilibrium preservation theorem for bisimulationinvariant strategies in a similar way as we were able to obtain Theorem 4.1, the analogous result for computation-based and trace-based strategies. Proof. First assume for contraposition thatf = (f 1 , . . . ,f n ) is not a Nash equilibrium in bisimulation-invariant strategies in G ′ . Then, there is a player i and a bisimulation-invariant strategy
For the opposite direction, assume for contraposition that f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is not a Nash equilibrium in bisimulation-invariant strategies in G. Then, there is a player i and a bisimulation-invariant strategy g i for i such that
We may conclude thatf is not an equilibrium in bisimulation-invariant strategies in G ′ either, concluding the proof.
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 4.9, it follows that the property of a computation or trace to be sustained by a bisimulation-invariant equilibria is also preserved under bisimilarity. 
Special Cases
In the previous section we provided results about the preservation of a given Nash equilibrium under bisimilarity, specifically, as long as we do not consider run-based strategies or goals. In this section we study two important special scenarios where this is not the case.
Firstly, consider the scenario where we have two-player games with run-based strategies and trace-based goals. This is an important special case since run-based strategies, as we emphasised in the introduction, are the "conventional" model of strategies used in logics such as ATL * or SL, as well as in systems represented as concurrent game structures. In particular, we show that with respect to two-player games with run-based strategies and trace-based goals (which include temporal logic goals), the setting coincides with the one with bisimulation-invariant strategies and trace-based goals, for which the preservation of Nash equilibria under bisimilarity holds. A key observation in this case is that in twoplayer games the existence of Nash equilibria can be characterised in terms of the existence of certain winning strategies, which are preserved across bisimilar systems.
Secondly, we also study the scenario where concurrent game structures are restricted to those that are induced by iterated Boolean games [23] and Reactive Modules games [48] , two frameworks for the strategic analysis of AI and multi-agent systems, in particular, using model checking techniques. 2 In this case, we show that bisimulation-invariant strategies also coincide with run-based strategies, and therefore, that the positive results for bisimulationinvariant strategies presented in the previous section also transfer to this special case.
Two-Player Games. This section concerns the preservation under bisimilarity of Nash equilibria under bisimulation in two-player games. We deal with the cases in which the players' preferences are computation-based, trace-based, and run-based separately. Computation-based Preferences. The counter-example against the preservation of the existence of Nash equilibria in Section 4 involved three players. We find that, if preferences are computation-based, the example can be adapted so as to involve only two players, which gives rise to the following result. {(a, a) , (a, a ′ ), (b, b) , (b, b ′ )}. By an argument analogous to that presented in Section 4, it can then be appreciated that G 2 has a run-based equilibrium, whereas G 3 has not.
To see the former, observe that any run-based profile f * = (f * 1 , f * 2 ) will be an equilibrium
For every strategy g 1 for player 1, we then have
Then, if f 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a, player 1 would like to deviate and play a strategy g 1 with g 1 (s 0 ) = g 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b; if f 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a ′ , to deviate and play a strategy g ′ 1 with g ′ 1 (s 0 ) = c and g ′ 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b; if f 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b to deviate and play a strategy g ′′ 1 with g ′′ 1 (s 0 ) = b and g ′′ 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a; and, finally, if f 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = b ′ to deviate and play a strategy g ′′′ 1 with g ′′′ 1 (s 0 ) = c and g ′′′ 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a. On the other hand, if κ M 3 (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 2 , it must be the case that f 1 (s 0 ) ∈ {b, c}. Observe, however, that player 2 would then like to deviate and play any strategy g 2 with g 2 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a if f 1 (s 0 , s 1 ) = a and to a strategy
As, furthermore, Γ 1 and Γ 2 are disjoint, that is, the goals players 1 and 2 cannot simultaneously be satisfied, it follows that G 5 has no run-based equilibria.
Run-based Preferences. We now address the preservation (of the existence) of Nash equilibria in two-player CGS-games where both preferences and strategies are run-based. In contrast to our findings in the previous section, we find that, under a natural closure restriction on the players' preferences, we are able to obtain a positive result. Our proof relies on the equivalence of run-based profiles and run-invariant profiles as expounded in Section 3.
As already noted above, run-based strategies cannot generally be identified directly across bisimilar CGS-games. The reason for this complication is that runs are sequences of states, and the sets of states of the two CGS-games need not coincide. In Section 3, we saw, however, how run-based strategies correspond to run-invariant strategies, which are computation-based by definition. Lemma 2.2, moreover, allows us to compare computationbased strategies, even if they may be run-invariant in the one model but not in the other.
Let f = (f 1 , f 2 ) be a given run-invariant equilibrium in a CGS-game G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) based on M and let G ′ = (M ′ , Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) be a CGS-game based on a concurrent game structure M ′ bisimilar to M . We define a (computation-based) profile f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ) that is a run-invariant equilibrium in both G and G ′ . To prove that f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ) is a run-invariant equilibrium if f = (f 1 , f 2 ) is, we exploit a characterisation of Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies. 3 We say that a run-invariant strategy f i for player i is winning against player j whenever κ M (f i , f j ) / ∈ Γ j for all run-invariant strategies f j of player j. We then have the following lemma, which is independent of the type of preferences that players have. 
∈ Γ 1 implies that f 2 is a winning strategy against player 1, and (2) κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 2 implies that f 1 is a winning strategy against player 2.
Proof. For the "if" direction assume for contraposition that f = (f 1 , f 2 ) is not a runinvariant equilibrium. Then, either κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 1 and κ M (g 1 , f 2 ) ∈ Γ 1 for some runinvariant strategy g 1 for player 1, or κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 2 and κ M (f 1 , g 2 ) ∈ Γ 2 for some runinvariant strategy g 2 for player 2. If the former, f 2 is not winning against player 1, refuting 1.
If the latter, f 1 is not winning against player 2, which refutes 2.
The opposite direction is also by contraposition. Assume that either 1 or 2 is not satisfied. Without loss of generality we may assume the former. Then, κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 1 and f 2 is not a winning strategy against player 1. Accordingly, there is some run-invariant strategy g 1 for player 1 such that κ M (g 1 , f 2 ) ∈ Γ 1 and it follows that f = (f 1 , f 2 ) is not a run-invariant equilibrium.
In order to have a formally convenient characterisation of the goals sets Γ 1 and Γ 2 to be run-based in two bisimilar CGS-games and to define the profile f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ), we furthermore introduce the following notations and auxiliary concepts. For a concurrent game structure M and finite computations κ, κ ′ ∈ comps M , we write κ ≡ M κ ′ if π M (κ) = π M (κ). Furthermore, we say that finite computations κ and κ ′ are finitely congruent in M and M ′ , in symbols κ ≡ K M,M ′ κ ′ , whenever there are (not necessarily distinct) intermediate
As ≡ M and ≡ M ′ are equivalence relations, we may assume that here ≡ M and ≡ M ′ alternate and κ j ≡ M κ j+1 if j is even, and κ j ≡ M ′ κ j+1 if j is odd. We will generally omit the subscript in K M,M ′ when M and M ′ are clear from the context. For an example, see again Figure 3 . Consider the (one-step) computations κ 1 = (a, a), κ 2 = (a, b), κ 3 = (b, a), and κ 4 = (b, b). Then, κ 1 ≡ M 1 ,M 2 κ 3 , because κ 1 ≡ M 1 κ 2 and κ 2 ≡ M 2 κ 3 . On the other hand, some reflection reveals that κ 1 ≡ K M 1 ,M 2 κ 4 . It is worth noting that finite congruence of two computations implies statewise bisimilarity of the runs induced, that is, 
We assume that m is even; the case where m is odd follows by the same argument mutatis mutandis. By virtue of Lemma 2.3-1, we have π M (κ ℓ )∼ π M ′ (κ ℓ ) for every 0 ≤ ℓ < m. Hence,
As obviously π M (κ ℓ ) = π M (κ ℓ+1 ) and π M ′ (κ ℓ ) = π M ′ (κ ℓ+1 ) imply, respectively, π M (κ ℓ )∼ π M (κ ℓ+1 ) and π M ′ (κ ℓ )∼ π M ′ (κ ℓ+1 ), also
By transitivity of∼ we may conclude that π M (κ)∼ π M (κ).
For bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M ′ , we say that a computation-based strategy
, for all finite computations κ, κ ′ ∈ comps M . We find that K M,M ′ -invariance exactly captures the concept of a strategy that is run-invariant in two bisimilar concurrent game structures. 
The argument for f i being run-invariant in M ′ is analogous.
For the "if"-direction, assume that f i is run-invariant in both M and M ′ , and consider arbitrary κ, κ ′ ∈ comps such that κ ≡ K κ ′ . Then, we may assume that there are κ 0 , . . 
Having assumed that f i is run-invariant in both M and M ′ , then also
As we have argued in Section 1, for the question whether the Nash equilibria across two bisimilar CGS-games are preserved to make sense, the players' preferences in the two games have to be congruent, that is, they have to be the same and of the same type in both games. In this section we deal with run-based preferences. We have already seen in Section 4, that identity of a player's computation-based preferences in two CGSs does not guarantee their being congruent as run-based preferences. By imposing an additional closedness restriction, however, we find that a computation-based goal set can be guaranteed to be run-based in two CGS-games based on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M ′ . Accordingly, call a goal set Γ i K M,M ′ -closed if for all computations κ = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . and 
. and ρ M (κ ′ ) = t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , . . . . Then, for every k ≥ 0, we also have that
For the remainder, let G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) and G ′ = (M ′ , Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) be two two-player CGSgames based on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M ′ such that both Γ 1 and Γ 2 are K M,M ′ -closed (and thus, in particular, run-based). We prove that if there is a runinvariant equilibrium in M , then there is also a K-invariant profile that is a run-invariant equilibrium in M . We construct for a given strategy profile
, (ii) if f 1 is a winning strategy against player 2, then so is f K 1 , (iii) if f 2 is a winning strategy against player 1, then so is f K 2 . On basis of Lemma 5.2 we may then conclude that f K corresponds to a run-invariant equilibrium in M . Having defined f K formally as a computation-based profile, by Theorem 4.1 it follows that f K is also a computation-based equilibrium in G ′ . Finally, because f K is K M,M ′ -invariant, we know that it furthermore corresponds to a run-invariant equilibrium in both M and M ′ .
We first define the strategy profile f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ). 4 To do so we assume a wellordering of the action sets Ac 1 and Ac 2 of players 1 and 2, respectively. Then, for all finite computations κ = d 0 , . . . , d k in comps M , we define inductively and simultaneously computations κ d 0 ,. . .,d k
) and x 2 is the least action available to player 2 such that a 2 ) . Then, obviously, a 1 and a 2 are available to players 1 and 2 respectively at state s ′ k . As s k ∼ s ′ k , that should also be the case at s k . A similar argument applies to the case where d 0 , . . 
We are now in a position to define strategies f K 1 and f K 2 such that, for all finite computations κ = d 0 , . . . , d k in comps M ,
The definition of strategies f K 1 and 
have been defined so as to be K-invariant. The claim then follows by induction on the length of κ. Let i = 1; the case for i = 2 is analogous. If the length of κ is 0, we have κ = κ ǫ f 1 = ǫ, and it immediately follows that κ ≡ K κ ǫ f 1 . For the induction step, let κ = d 0 , . . . , d k , d k+1 and assume that d 0 , . . 
Then, clause (i.1) applies and we have
Then clause (ii.1) applies and we have that x 1 = f 1 (d ′ 0 , . . . , d ′ k ) and x 2 is the least action available to player 2 such that d ′ 0 , .
Finally, assume that neither of the above, then clause (iii.1) applies and we have that x 1 and x 2 are the least actions available to players 1 and 2 such that d ′ 0 , . . . , d ′ k , (x 1 , x 2 ) ≡ K d 0 , . . . , d k+1 . As such actions exist, we conclude that d ′ 0 , .
We are now in a position to prove the following crucial lemmas. 5 Lemma 5. 7 . Let f = (f 1 , f 2 ) be a run-invariant strategy profile for concurrent game structure M and f K defined as above.
. Proof. Let us use the following notations:
. It then suffices to prove by induction on k that for every k ≥ 0, we have
For k = 0, let d 0 = (a 0 1 , a 0 2 ) and
In a similar way we find that a 0 2 = b 0 2 , and hence d 0 = d K 0 . Because both f 1 (ǫ) = a 0 1 and f 2 (ǫ) = a 0 2 , we also have d ′ 0 = d 0 , and, a fortiori, d ′ 0 ≡ K d 0 . Hence, clause (i.1) applies and therefore d ′ 0 = (f 1 (ǫ), f 2 (ǫ)) = (a 0 1 , a 0 2 ) = d 0 . In a similar way we can establish that d ′′ 0 = d 0 . For the induction step, we may assume that
Then,
. For player 2, the following equalities hold:
From the above, we already had
Therefore, clause (i.1) is applicable, and both
By an analogous reasoning we show that d k+1 = d ′′ k+1 . The next lemma establishes that f K 1 and f K 2 are winning run-invariant strategies against player 2 and player 1, respectively, if the goal sets Γ 1 and Γ 2 are to be run-based. Notice that this result requires Γ 1 and Γ 2 to be K M,M ′ -closed.
Lemma 5. 8 . Let f = (f 1 , f 2 ) be a run-invariant strategy profile in game G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) with Γ 1 and Γ 2 run-based and K-closed, and f K defined as above. Then, (1) if f 1 is a winning (run-invariant) strategy against player 2, then so is f K 1 , (2) if f 2 is a winning (run-invariant) strategy against player 1, then so is f K 2 . Proof. For part 1, assume for contraposition that f K 1 is not winning against player 2. Then, there is a strategy g 2 for player 2 such that κ(f K 1 , g 2 ) ∈ Γ 2 . We define a K-invariant strategy g K 2 for player 2 such that d 0 , . . . , d k ≡ K e 0 , . . . , e k for every k ≥ 0, where κ(f K 1 , g 2 ) = d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , . . . and d k = (a 1 , a 2 ), κ(f 1 , g K 2 ) = e 0 , e 1 , e 2 , . . . . and e k = (b 1 , b 2 ).
By Γ 2 being K-closed it then follows that also κ(f 1 , g K 2 ) ∈ Γ 2 , which contradicts our initial assumption that f 1 is winning strategy against player 2. For each k ≥ 0, let furthermore
. In order to define the strategy g K 2 , we may assume the existence some K-invariant strategy h 2 for player 2. For the empty computation ǫ we have g K For every finite computation d 0 , . . . , d k , we have that
is the least action y k+1 2 available to player 2 such that
if such an action y k+1 2 exists and case (i) does not apply, (iii.4) x k+1 2 = h(d 0 , . . . , d k ) in all other cases. Observe that g K 2 is K-invariant by construction. We now prove by induction on k that e 0 , . . . , e k = d ′ 0 , . . . , d ′ k for every k ≥ 0. If k = 0, recall that e 0 = (b 0 1 , b 0 2 ) and d 0 0 = (c 0 1 , c 0 2 ). Observe that f K 1 (ǫ) = f 1 (κ ǫ ) = f 1 (ǫ). Thus we have d 0 = (f 1 (ǫ), g 2 (ǫ)) = (f 1 (ǫ), g 2 (ǫ)), and in particular d 0 ≡ K (f 1 (ǫ), g 2 (ǫ)). Hence, there is some y 0 2 such that (f 1 (ǫ), y 0 Observe that
First assume that equation ( * ) holds for y k+1
. Then clause (i.1) applies and for d ′ k+1 = (c k+1 1 , c k+1 2 ) we have c k+1
. Now for player 1 we find that b k+1
For player 2, observe that, in the case we are considering,
. Finally, assume that equation ( * ) does not hold for y k+1
be the least action for player 2 for which equation ( * ) does hold with y k+1 = x k+1 2 . As in this case clause (i.2) applies and for d ′ k+1 = (c k+1 1 , c k+1 2 ), we have, c k+1
. For player 1 we again find that, b k+1
. Accordingly, clause (ii.4) applies and we have g K 2 (e 0 , . . . , e k ) = x k+1 2 . It then follows that, b k+1 2 = g K 2 (e 0 , . . . , e k ) = f 2 (d ′ 0 , . . . , d ′ k ) = c k+1 2 . Again we may conclude that e k+1 = (b k+1 1 , b k+1 2 ) = (c k+1 1 , c k+1 2 ) = d ′ k+1 , as desired. The proof for part 2 is analogous to that of part 1.
The ground has now been cleared for the main result of this paper that the existence of run-invariant equilibria is preserved under bisimulation in two-player games provided that the run-based preferences of the players are K M,M ′ -closed.
Theorem 5. 9 . Let G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) and G ′ = (M ′ , Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) be two two-player games on bisimilar concurrent game structures such that Γ 1 and Γ 2 are run-based and K M,M ′ -closed.
Proof. Assume that f = (f 1 , f 2 ) is a run-invariant strategy profile in M . By Lemma 5.2, then both (1) κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 1 implies that f 2 is a winning strategy against player 1 in M , and (2) κ M (f 1 , f 2 ) / ∈ Γ 2 implies that f 1 is a winning strategy against player 2 in M . On basis of 1, Lemma 5.
∈ Γ 1 and we may assume that f 2 is a winning strategy against player 1 in M . In virtue of Lemma 5.8 we may then conclude that f K 2 is a winning strategy against player 1 in M . Assuming that κ M (f K 1 , f K 2 ) / ∈ Γ 1 , we can reason analogously and infer that f 1 is a winning strategy against player 2 in M . Hence,
is a winning strategy against player 1 in M , and (2 ′ ) κ M (f K 1 , f K 2 ) / ∈ Γ 2 implies that f K 1 is a winning strategy against player 2 in M .
Accordingly, f K is a computation-based equilibrium in M . By Theorem 4.1 we may infer that f K is also a computation-based equilibrium in M ′ . Lemma 5.6 then guarantees that f K is K M,M ′ -invariant, and it follows that f K is run-invariant in M ′ as well. By virtue of Theorem 3.5 we may finally conclude that f K is also a run-invariant equilibrium in M ′ .
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.9, we have the following result, which is phrased in terms of run-based strategies instead of run-invariant strategies.
Corollary 5. 10 . Let G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) and G ′ = (M ′ , Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) be two two-player games on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M ′ such that Γ 1 and Γ 2 are run-based and K M,M ′ -closed. Let furthermore ρ ∈ runs ω M be a run in M that is sustained by a run-based equilibrium in M . Then, there is a run ρ ′ ∈ runs ω M ′ in M ′ that is statewise bisimilar to ρ and that is also sustained by a run-based equilibrium in M ′ .
Proof. Let run ρ ∈ runs ω M be sustained by a run-based equilibrium f = (f 1 , f 2 ) in G and letf = (f 1 ,f 2 ) be the run-invariant strategy profile corresponding to f . Lemma 3.4 guarantees thatf = (f 1 ,f 2 ) is a run-invariant equilibrium in G. Now construct profilě
, which by virtue of Theorem 5.9 is then K M,M ′ -invariant and is to a runinvariant equilibrium in both G and G ′ . By virtue Lemma 2.2-1, it moreover follows that
are statewise bisimilar, which concludes the proof.
A further corollary of Theorem 5.9 is that the existence of run-based equilibria is preserved in two-player games with run-based and K M,M ′ -closed preferences.
Trace-based Preferences. We find that, with a couple of slight modifications, essentially the same construction as in the previous section can be leveraged to prove that run-based equilibria are also preserved under bisimulation in two-player games with trace-based preferences. It be emphasised that here we do not require the preferences to satisfy any other condition than being trace-based.
Let two CGS-games G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) and G ′ = (M ′ , Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) on bisimilar concurrent game structures M and M ′ and with Γ 1 and Γ 2 trace-based be given. For a run-invariant equilibrium f = (f 1 , f 2 ) in game G, we define the K M,M ′ -invariant strategy-profile f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ) as in the previous section. We prove that f K = (f K 1 , f K 2 ) is also a run-invariant equilibrium in G ′ . To this end, we adapt Lemma 5.8 so as to apply to trace-based preferences instead of to preferences that are both run-based and K M,M ′ -closed.
Lemma 5. 11 . Let f = (f 1 , f 2 ) be a run-invariant strategy profile in game G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) with Γ 1 and Γ 2 trace-based, and f K defined as above. Then, (1) if f 1 is a winning (run-invariant) strategy against player 2, then so is f K 1 , (2) if f 2 is a winning (run-invariant) strategy against player 1, then so is f K 2 . Proof. For part 1-part 2 follows by an analogous argument-assume for contraposition that f K 1 is not a winning strategy against player 2. Then, there is a strategy g 2 for player 2 such that κ(f K 1 , g 2 ) ∈ Γ 2 . We define a K M,M ′ -invariant strategy g K 2 for player 2 exactly as in the proof of Lemma 5. 8 . Accordingly, d 0 , . . . , d k ≡ K M,M ′ e 0 , . . . , e k for every k ≥ 0, where 
. As a consequence of Γ 2 being trace-based, we obtain κ(f 1 , g K 2 ) ∈ Γ 2 , which contradicts our initial assumption that f 1 is winning strategy against player 2.
We are now in a position to prove the counterpart of Theorem 5.9 for trace-based preferences, showing that run-invariant equilibria are preserved under bisimulation if the players' preferences are trace-based.
Theorem 5. 12 . Let G = (M, Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) and G ′ = (M ′ , Γ 1 , Γ 2 ) be two two-player games on bisimilar concurrent game structures such that Γ 1 and Γ 2 are trace-based.
The proof is fully analogous to that for Theorem 5.9, invoking Lemma 5.11 instead of Lemma 5. 8 .
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.12, we find that also the existence of runinvariant equilibria is preserved in two-player games with trace-based preferences. Furthermore, also the counterpart of Corollary 5.10 for trace-based preferences can easily be demonstrated.
Boolean Game Structures. We now consider a subclass of concurrent game structures in which Nash equilibrium is invariant under bisimilarity. Specifically, we study games played over the class of concurrent game structures induced by iterated Boolean games [23] , a framework that can be used to reason about Nash equilibria in games and multi-agent systems modelled using the Reactive Modules specification language [2] .
By a Boolean game structure we understand a special type of concurrent game structure M = (Ag, AP, Ac, St, s 0 M , λ, δ) for which there is a partition {AP 1 , . . . , AP n } of AP such that Ac i (s) ⊆ (2 AP i \ ∅) for all players i and states s and for every direction d ′ = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) in 2 AP 1 × · · · × 2 AP n and every state s, it holds that δ(s, d ′ ) = s ′ implies λ(s ′ ) = a 1 ∪ · · · ∪ a n .
Then, informally, in a Boolean game structure, choice profiles correspond to system states, which is not generally the case in concurrent game structures. In other words, in a Boolean game structure M , if a strategy profile induces a run s 0 M , s 1 , s 2 , . . ., then we know that it has been induced by the computation s 1 , s 2 , . . .. Even more, we also know that the trace induced by such a computation is precisely s 0 M , s 1 , s 2 , . . .. This very strong correspondence between computations, runs, and traces is key to the proof that in Boolean game structures all strategies for a player are in fact bisimulation-invariant. This result, in turn, can also be used to show that Nash equilibrium is invariant under bisimilarity, regardless of the model of strategies or goals that one chooses. To see this, the following preliminary results will be useful.
Lemma 5. 13 . Let M = (Ag, AP, Ac, St, s 0 , λ, δ) be a Boolean game structure with partition {AP 1 , . . . , AP n }. Let π = s 0 , . . . , s k and π ′ = s ′ 0 , . . . , s ′ k be statewise bisimilar finite histories, that is, π∼ π ′ . Then, π = π ′ .
Proof. We may assume that there are finite computations κ = d 0 , . . As M is a Boolean game structure, it follows that d ′ = (λ(s m+1 ) ∩ AP 1 , . . . , λ(s m+1 ) ∩ AP n ) and
The above lemma can be used to show that in fact, for Boolean game structures, all models of strategies collapse to the model of bisimulation-invariant strategies.
Lemma 5. 14. In Boolean game structures, all strategies for every player are bisimulationinvariant.
Proof.
Consider an arbitrary strategy f i of a player i in a Boolean game structure M along with arbitrary statewise bisimilar histories π, π ′ ∈ runs M , that is, π∼ π ′ . By Lemma 5.13, then π = π ′ . Hence, trivially, f i (π) = f i (π ′ ).
We can now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 5. 15 . In Boolean game structures, (the existence of a) Nash equilibrium is invariant under bisimilarity.
Proof. Observe that because of Lemma 5.14, in Boolean game structures, a strategy profile f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if f is a Nash equilibrium in bisimulation-invariant strategies. The result then immediately follows from Corollary 4.10.
Nondeterminism
Our results so far, summarised in Table 1 , apply to profiles of deterministic strategies and deterministic systems. In this section, we investigate the case of nondeterministic systems. In this more general setting, most of our notations and definitions remain the same, except for two that are particularly relevant: the notions of outcome of a game and Nash equilibrium.
Note that in a deterministic system, a profile of deterministic strategies induces a unique system path (and therefore a unique computation, run, and trace). However, if the system is nondeterministic, a profile of deterministic strategies might, instead, determine a set of paths of the system: all those complying with the profile of strategies. For instance, in the system in Figure 6 , the deterministic strategy profile where every player i chooses to play a i at the beginning determines two different runs and traces of the system. Therefore, formally, a deterministic strategy profile f on a nondeterministic system M may determine a set of computations in comps ω M . To simplify notations, we will write κ M (f ) ⊆ comps ω M for such a set, which will correspond to the set of computations that could result in M when playing strategy profile f . Likewise, we will write ρ M (f ) ⊆ runs ω M and τ M (f ) ⊆ traces ω M , respectively, for the sets of runs and traces determined by f on M . These three sets of computations, runs, and traces determined by f , namely κ M (f ), ρ M (f ), and τ M (f ), will correspond to our more general notion of (computation, run, trace) outcome of a multi-player game. Clearly, for deterministic systems, these sets of computations, runs, and traces will correspond to the special case where outcomes are singleton sets. This more general definition of outcome call for a (just slightly) more general definition of equilibrium. The generalisation is rather simple. With respect to a nondeterministic system M , we will define the preferences Γ i of a player i as a set of sets of computations of M , rather than just a set of computations, as in the deterministic case. In other words, while in a deterministic system we have Γ i ⊆ comps ω M , in a nondeterministic system we have Γ i ⊆ 2 comps ω M . With this definition in place, we can define a Nash equilibrium in exactly the same way that it is defined for deterministic systems, that is, as a strategy profile f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) such that for every player i and every strategy g i available to i,
As for deterministic systems, the concepts of Nash equilibrium in run-based strategies and Nash equilibrium in trace-based strategies are defined analogously.
We first note that all negative results for deterministic systems immediately carry over to this more general setting as those are simply the case when deterministic strategy profiles induce a unique computation (a singleton set of computations). On the other hand, although positive results for computations and traces also carry over to nondeterministic systems, this is not something that one can immediately conclude. A couple of technical results are needed. In the reminder of this section we will study why positive results for computations and traces do carry over to nondeterministic systems.
The first observation to make is that the set of strategy profiles across bisimilar systems is invariant, that is, that every collection of (computation-based, trace-based) strategies f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is a strategy profile in a system M if and only if f is a strategy profile in M ′ , for every M ′ that is bisimilar to M . Proof. By induction on the length of computations/traces, and noting that, for every player, the set of actions available to a player in bisimilar states is the same (as otherwise the two states would not be bisimilar).
The second observation is that, despite nondeterminism, the outcome of games across bisimilar systems is invariant. Formally, we have the following result. 
Proof.
There are four different cases to consider here: either f is computation-based or f is trace-based, and either the outcome of the game is taken to be the set of computations, or the outcome of the game is taken to be the set of traces.
By double inclusion, we show the first case: f being computation-based and the outcome of the game taken to be the set of computations. To show that κ M (f ) ⊆ κ M ′ (f ), with f computation-based, reason by contradiction. Suppose that there is a computation κ * in κ M (f ) that is not in κ M ′ (f ). Since M and M ′ are bisimilar, κ * is also a computation of M ′ , and due to Lemma 6.1, for every prefix κ * k of κ * , we know that f (κ * k ) is defined. Since f is functional, f (κ * k ) in M ′ is the same as f (κ * k ) in M , which must be precisely the last direction of κ * k+1 . By an inductive argument we can conclude that κ * must also be a computation of κ M ′ (f ), which is a contradiction to our hypothesis, proving the statement. We can reason in a symmetric way to prove the inclusion in the other direction. Note that for computation-based strategies not only κ M (f ) = κ M ′ (f ), but also they are singleton sets.
The second case we consider is when f is trace-based and the outcome of the game is taken to be the set of traces. To show this case, we can reason similarly, but, unlike for computation-based strategies, the sets τ M (f ) and τ M ′ (f ) may not be singleton sets. We, again, show the result by double inclusion, and each direction by contradiction. Thus, first, suppose that there is a trace τ * in τ M (f ) that is not in τ M ′ (f ). Since M and M ′ are bisimilar, τ * is also a trace of M ′ , and due to Lemma 6.1, for every prefix τ * k of τ * , we know that f (τ * k ) is defined. Let τ * k be the smallest prefix of τ * that is not a prefix of any trace in τ M ′ (f ), and let s be any state that can be reached after following the finite trace τ * k−1 from s 0 M , the initial state of M . Then, we know that s
− −−−− → q, for some q such that λ(q) is the last element of τ * k . Necessarily, the prefix τ * k−1 is the prefix of some trace in τ M ′ (f ) that leads to a state, say s ′ , that is bisimilar to s. Because s and s ′ are bisimilar, s ′ f (τ * k−1 ) −→ q ′ for some state q ′ that is bisimilar to q. Lemma 6.1 ensures that f is defined at τ * k−1 in M ′ . Since q and Θ ′ k−1 = s 0
We note that the main idea behind the proofs in this section is that if a given strategy profile f , whether computation-based or trace-based, does not determine the same set of computations and traces in bisimilar systems, then that computation or trace could be used to show that the two systems are in fact not bisimilar. This is the main argument behind the four cases in Lemma 6.2, each requiring slightly different proofs that such a witness to the non-bisimilarity of M and M ′ does not exist. However, it is also important to note that if M and M ′ are not bisimilar, then a given strategy profile f , well defined in both systems, may not determine the same set of outcomes-see, for instance, the example in Figure 7 .
We would also like to note that even though for deterministic systems, computationbased strategies strictly generalise run-based strategies, and run-based strategies strictly generalise trace-base strategies, for nondeterministic systems this is no longer the case. Run-based strategies still generalise trace-based strategies, but not other relation like this holds between any other pair of models of strategies. For instance, as shown in the example in Figure 8 , there is a system in which, for instance, a trace-based strategy can be defined (as well as a run-based strategy) while a computation-based strategy cannot.
Finally, the reader may have noticed that in this section we did not study the case considering run-based preferences (for run-based strategies we know that the negative results for deterministic systems carry over). The reason is that, as shown for deterministic systems, we can ensure invariance of (the existence of) Nash equilibria with respect to bisimilarity only if the sets of run-based preferences are congruent between bisimilar systems. As this is regarded as a major drawback, even for deterministic systems as illustrated in the example in Figure 9 , it is really not an interesting question to be investigated any further.
Strategy Logics: New Semantic Foundations
Several logics for strategic reasoning have been proposed in the literature of computer science and AI, such as ATL * [1] , Strategy Logic [35, 12] , Coalition Logic [38] , Coordination Logic [19] , Game Logic [39] , and Equilibrium Logic [25] . In several cases, the model of strategies that is used is the one that we refer to as run-based in this paper, that is, strategies are functions from finite sequences of states (of some arena) to actions/decisions/choices of players in a given game. As can be seen from our results so far, of the four options we have This does not necessarily immediately imply that a particular logic with a run-based strategy model is not invariant under bisimilarity. For instance, ATL * is a bisimulationinvariant logic and, as shown in [22] one can reason about Nash equilibrium using ATL * only up-to bisimilarity. A question then remains: whether any of these logics for strategic reasoning becomes invariant under bisimilarity-as explained before, a desirable propertyif one changes the model of strategies considered there to, for instance, computation-based or trace-based strategies. We find that this question has a satisfactory positive answer in some cases. In particular, we will consider the above question in the context of Strategy Logic as studied in [35] , and in doing so we will provide new semantic foundations for strategy logics.
Let us start by introducing the syntax and semantics under the run-based model of strategies for Strategy Logic (SL [35] ) as it has been given in [36] . Syntactically, SL extends LTL with two strategy quantifiers, x and [ [x] ], and an agent binding operator (i, x), where i is an agent and x is a variable. Intuitively, these operators can be understood as "there exists a strategy x", "for all strategies x", and "bind agent i to the strategy associated with the variable x", respectively. Formally, SL formulae are inductively built from a set of atomic propositions AP, variables Var, and agents Ag, using the following grammar, where p ∈ AP, x ∈ Var, and i ∈ Ag:
We also use the usual abbreviations for LTL formulae, that is, those for Boolean and temporal logic formulae.
We can now present the semantics of SL formulae. Given a concurrent game structure M , for all SL formulae ϕ, states s ∈ St in M , and assignments χ ∈ Asg = (Var ∪ Ag) → Str, mapping variables and agents to strategies, the relation M, χ, s |= ϕ is defined as follows: As an immediate corollary, we then obtain the following result about the semantic relationship between the properties that can be expressed in SL and the concept of bisimilarity. Finally, an analogous statement to the above Corollary can also be proved if we consider the model of trace-based strategies, leading to the next result on the semantics of SL. 
Concluding Remarks and Related Work
In this paper we showed that with the conventional model of strategies used in the logic, computer science, and AI literatures, the existence of Nash equilibria is not necessarily preserved under bisimilarity-in particular this is the case for multi-player games played over deterministic concurrent games structures. By way of some examples, we also illustrated some of the implications of this result-for example, in the context of automated formal verification. To resolve this difficulty, we furthermore investigated alternative models of strategies which exhibit some desirable properties, in particular, allowing for a formalisation of Nash equilibrium that is invariant under bisimilarity, even on nondeterministic systems.
We studied applications of these models and found that through their use, not only Nash equilibria become invariant under bisimilarity, but also full logics such as Strategy Logic. This renders it possible to combine commonly used optimisation techniques for model checking with decision procedures for the analysis of Nash equilibria, thus overcoming a critical problem of this kind of logics regarding practical applications via automated verification. Some work also in the intersection between bisimulation equivalences, concurrent game structures, Nash equilibria, and automated formal verification is summarised next.
Logics for Strategic Reasoning. There is now a large literature on logics for strategic reasoning. From this literature, ATL * [1] and SL [35] stand out, both due to their use within a number of practical tools for automated verification, and because of their expressive power. On the one hand, ATL * is known to be invariant under bisimilarity using the conventional model of strategies. As such, Nash equilibria can be expressed within ATL * only up to bisimilarity [22] . On the other hand, SL, which is strictly more expressive than ATL * , allows for a simple specification of Nash equilibria, but suffers from not being invariant under bisimilarity with respect to the conventional model of strategies. In this paper, we have put forward a number of solutions to this problem. An additional advantage of replacing the model of strategies for SL (and therefore for concurrent game structures) is that other solution concepts in game theory also become invariant under bisimilarity. For instance, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria and strong Nash equilibria-which are widely used when considering, respectively, dynamic behaviour and cooperative behaviour in multi-agent systems-can also be expressed in SL. Our results therefore imply that these concepts are also invariant under bisimilarity, when considering games over concurrent game structures and goals given by LTL formulae (which correspond to preferences over traces).
Bisimulation Equivalences for Multi-Agent Systems. Even though bisimilarity is probably the most widely used behavioural equivalence in concurrency, in the context of multi-agent systems other relations may be preferred, for instance, equivalence relations that take a detailed account of the independent interactions and behaviour of individual components in a multi-agent system. In such a setting, "alternating" relations with natural ATL * characterisations have been studied [3] . Our results also apply to such alternating equivalence relations. On the one hand, the counter-example shown in Figures 1 and 2 also apply to such alternating (bisimulation) relations. On the other hand, because these alternating equivalence relations can be characterised in ATL * , they are at most as strong as bisimilarity. These two facts together imply that Nash equilibria is not preserved by the alternating (bisimulation) equivalence relations in [3] either. Nevertheless, as discussed in [45] , the "right" notion of equivalence for games and their game theoretic solution concepts is, undoubtedly, an important and interesting topic of debate.
Tools for Model Checking and Equilibrium Analysis. Due to the success of temporal logics and model checking in the verification of concurrent and multi-agent systems, some model checking tools have been extended to cope with the strategic analysis of concurrent systems modelled as multi-player games. For instance, tools such as MCMAS [11] , EAGLE [43] , PRALINE [8] , MOCHA [4] , and PRISM [30] , allow for the analysis of some strategic properties in a system. Because all of these tools rely on underlying algorithms for temporal logic model checking, hardly any optimisations are possible when moving to the more complex game-theoretic setting where Nash equilibria needs to be analysed. In this way, our results find a powerful, and immediate, practical application. Indeed, based on the work presented in this paper, we have developed a new tool for temporal equilibrium analysis [26] , which uses the computation-based model of strategies studied here.
Computations vs. Traces. An important remark about the difference between computations and traces is that even though Nash equilibria and their existence are preserved under bisimilarity by three of the four strategy models we have studied, it is not the case that with each strategy model we obtain the same set of Nash equilibria in a given system, or that we can sustain the same set of computations or traces. For instance, consider again the games in Figures 1 and 2 . As we discussed above, if we consider the model of computation-based strategies and LTL goals (i.e., trace-based goals) as shown in the example, then we obtain two games, each with an associated non-empty set of Nash equilibria, which are preserved by bisimilarity. However, if we consider, instead, the model of trace-based strategies and the same LTL goals, then we obtain two concurrent games both with empty sets of Nash equilibria-thus, in this case, the non-existence of Nash equilibria is preserved by bisimilarity! To observe this, note that whereas in the case of computation-based strategies player 3 can implement a uniform "punishment" strategy for both player 1 and player 2, in the case of trace-based strategies player 3 cannot do so, even in the game in Figure 1 .
Two-Player Games with Trace-Based Goals. We also showed that if we consider twoplayer games together with the conventional model of strategies, the problems that arise with respect to the preservation of Nash equilibria disappear. This is indeed an important finding since most verification games (e.g., model and module checking, synthesis, etc.) can be phrased in terms of zero-sum two-player games together with temporal logic specifications (e.g., using LTL, CTL, or ATL * ). Our results, then, provide conclusive proof that, if only two-player games and temporal logic goals are needed, then all equilibrium analyses can be carried out using the conventional model of strategies-along with their associated reasoning tools and formal verification techniques.
Nondeterminism. We extended our main bisimulation-invariant results to nondeterministic systems, making it possible to analyse more complex systems. This was possible, in turn, because our two main models of strategies, namely computation-based and trace-based, are themselves oblivious to nondeterministic choices. As a consequence, given a particular strategy (or strategy profile, more generally), the set of outcomes of a multi-player game across bisimilar structures remains the same. Indeed, the definitions of strategies in the computation-based and trace-based models can be used to show that the set of Nash equilibria in strategy profiles given by these two models is invariant across systems that are equivalent with respect to equivalences for concurrency that are weaker than bisimilarity; for instance, across trace equivalent systems as defined in CSP [9] . Thus, with respect to this kind of systems, all our positive results also carry over, even for nondeterministic processes.
From Theory to Practice. As mentioned before, we have developed a new tool for temporal equilibrium analysis, which we call EVE [26] (Equilibrium Verification Environment). EVE uses the computation-based model of strategies and trace-based preferences given by LTL formulae. EVE is a formal verification tool for the automated analysis of temporal equilibrium properties of concurrent and multi-agent systems modelled using the Simple Reactive Module Language (SRML [2, 46] ) as a collection of independent system components (players/agents in a game). In particular, EVE automatically solves three key decision problems in rational synthesis and verification [24, 48, 20] : Non-Emptiness, E-Nash, and A-Nash. These problems ask, respectively, whether a multi-player game has at least one Nash equilibrium, whether an LTL formula holds on some Nash equilibrium, and whether an LTL formula holds on all Nash equilibria. EVE uses a technique based on parity games to check for the existence of Nash equilibria in a concurrent and multi-player game, which crucially relies on the underlying model of strategies being bisimulation invariant.
